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We study a standard two period exchange economy with one nominal asset. As is
well known there is a continuum of sunspot equilibria around each eﬃcient equilib-
rium. A sunspot equilibrium is ineﬃcient but some household may gain in sunspot
equilibria relative to the eﬃcient equilibrium. We show that a household’s equilib-
rium utility level is either locally maximized or locally minimized at the eﬃcient
equilibrium, and derive a condition which identiﬁes whether or not a household’s
utility is locally minimized or maximized.
1 Introduction
Consider a standard two period competitive exchange economy with inside money where
households are all risk averse. Using inside money as a medium of exchange, households
can borrow or save in the ﬁrst period. Under standard assumptions, a competitive
equilibrium exists and any competitive equilibrium is Pareto eﬃcient. Generically in
endowments, there are ﬁnitely many such competitive equilibria. However, there may be
sunspot equilibria where the second period consumption depends on extrinsic signals.1
∗The ﬁnancial support by Grant-in-Aid for the 21st Century COE Program and Grant-in-Aid for
Scientiﬁc Research is gratefully acknowledged. The author thanks Sergio Currarini, Aditya Goenka, Piero
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1For the economic implications of sunspot equilibria, see Cass and Shell (1983).
1In fact, it can be shown that a continuum of sunspot equilibria also exists around each
of these eﬃcient competitive equilibria.2
A sunspot equilibrium is Pareto ineﬃcient, and therefore in each sunspot equilibrium
there must be at least one household who is worse oﬀ than in the respective eﬃcient
equilibrium. One can consider various scenarios about welfare distributions associated
with sunspot equilibria. Of course, the ineﬃciency does not imply that all the households
are worse oﬀ, but it certainly seems plausible and intuitive if this is the case. It may even
appear that this will be a prevailing case, since a sunspot equilibrium is “contaminated”
by extrinsic, welfare irrelevant randomization by construction, and risk averse households
do not appreciate such randomization.
In general, it is true that if the expected real return from an asset is kept constant,
increasing the volatility of its returns is welfare worsening to any household. But notice
that there is a general equilibrium eﬀect through changing prices, which is overlooked in
the observation above. The expected real returns are determined in equilibrium. In the
simple set up we consider where a nominal bond (inside money) is the only asset, if its
average real returns in a sunspot equilibria beneﬁts a particular household, and if the
beneﬁt is large enough to oﬀset the loss from the increasing volatility, such a household
could gain by sunspots.
As far as we know, this important implication of general equilibrium eﬀects on wel-
fare gains and losses in sunspot equilibria is not addressed well in the literature, until
Goenka-Pr´ echac (2006): although they considered only a special symmetric model of
two households, they derived a simple condition expressed in the derivatives of utility
functions, under which the utility level of the borrower (the seller of the asset) is locally
minimized at the eﬃcient equilibrium, and that of the saver is locally maximized.
The Goenka-Pr´ echac condition says that the households are prudent enough at the
eﬃcient equilibrium, i.e., the third derivative of utility function is positive and large
enough relative to its second derivative. The condition is satisﬁed for the log utility case,
as well as for a wide range of popular parametric classes of utility functions. Thus within
their setup, the borrower are beneﬁtted from sunspots in a large class of economies.
It is however hard to see the general equilibrium intuition in their condition on the
prudence. This is so because of the special symmetric structure of their model. Not only
2See Cass (1992). See also Pietra (1992) and Suda-Tallon-Villanacci (1992).
2there are just two households, but also it is assumed that households have identical pref-
erences represented by a time separable and time invariant utility function. Moreover,
the total endowment is the same in the two periods, and households’ endowments are
symmetric in the sense that household 1’s ﬁrst period endowment is equal to household
2’s second period endowment. Thus although their condition gives an impression that
individual risk preferences determine the beneﬁciary from sunspots, the general equilib-
rium eﬀect is possibly concealed in the special structure. More importantly, it may well
be the case that the general class of economies where the borrower is beneﬁtted from
sunspots is not as large as it seems.
The purpose of this paper is to obtain a deeper understanding of welfare gains and
losses in sunspot equilibria. Given discussions above, it is desirable not to rely on sym-
metry up front. We therefore study a very general model: except that we keep the
assumption of single consumption good in each period, the number of households is
arbitrary, and their utility functions and endowments are general. Our analysis takes
advantage of symmetry about sunspot states, but nothing else.
In such a general framework with S sunspot states, the equilibrium utility level is
expressed by a function of S−1 variables. We ﬁnd a condition which tells whether or not
a household’s equilibrium utility level is locally minimized or maximized at the eﬃcient
equilibrium (Proposition 6). Our condition says that the net beneﬁt from sunspots is
the sum of two terms, where the ﬁrst negative term corresponds to the risk eﬀect, and
the second term represents the general equilibrium eﬀect, so it conﬁrms the intuition we
outlined above.
Interestingly enough, even when the equilibrium welfare function as above has more
than one variables, it is either locally concave or convex at the eﬃcient equilibrium.
Using this condition, we show that either all the savers’ or all the borrowers’, or all
the households’ equilibrium utility level is locally maximized at the eﬃcient equilibrium
(Corollary 8).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. The main
analysis and the results mentioned above are contained in Section 3. We elaborate the
results by relating the model to the standard simple portfolio problem in Section 4. We
also discuss in Section 4 why it tends to be a borrower if there is a household who is
beneﬁtted from sunspots. The Goenka-Pr´ echac condition is re-examined in the light of
3our results in Section 5 to see how the general equilibrium eﬀects and the risk eﬀect are
mixed in their simple condition. Section 6 contains a few remarks.
2 The Model
We consider a standard competitive two-period exchange economy. There is one per-
ishable consumption good in each period to be traded. There are H ≥ 2 households,
labelled by h = 1,2,...H. Household h is endowed with e0
h units of good in the ﬁrst
period (period 0) and e1







In the ﬁrst period, period 0, a nominal asset which pays oﬀ one unit in units of account
in the second period is traded. The net supply of the asset is zero, so it is inside money
whose real returns are to be determined in the markets.
At the beginning of the second period, a state s = 1,2,...,S occurs which is publicly
observed. We assume that these are sunspot states, and they are equally probable.3
Denote by rs > 0 the real return of the asset in units of the ﬁrst period consumption
good when the state is s; that is, the price of the asset is normalized to be one, and
if z units of the asset is held at the end of the ﬁrst period, rsz units of consumption
good is delivered at the beginning of the second period. Writing zh for the asset holding
of household h, the consumption of household h is therefore e0
h − zh in period 0 and
e1
h + zhrs in state s in period 1.4 If zh > 0, then household h is referred to as a saver,
and if zh < 0, then household h is referred to as a borrower.
The preferences of household h are represented by a von Neumann Morgenstern
utility function uh : R2




household h chooses zh such that e0
h − zh > 0 and e1
h + zhrs > 0 for every s = 1,...,S,







h + zhrs 
. (1)
3The assumption of equal probability is not restrictive. See Section 6.
4This is of course a reduced form and it is equivalent to the standard sequential budget constraints.
If we write x
0 and p
0 for the ﬁrst period consumption and the (nominal) price of good, and x
s and p
s for











= ˆ z for s = 1,...,S. Then setting r
s = p
s/p
0 and z = p
0ˆ z, we
get the reduced form in the text.
4A household is a price taker by assumption and so household h’s problem is to choose









h + zhrs 
(2)
subject to e0
h − zh > 0 and e1
h + zhrs > 0, s = 1,..,S.
Note that the problem (2) is nothing but a standard, simple portfolio choice problem
between consumption and a risky asset, but with possibly time non-separable utility
function.5 The inside money constitutes a risky asset since although the nominal return
is ﬁxed by assumption, its real return can be random.
It is assumed that uh is C3, diﬀerentiably strictly increasing (i.e., for any xh ∈ R2
++,
the gradient Duh (xh) is strictly positive), diﬀerentiably strictly concave (i.e., for any
xh ∈ R2
++, the Hessian D2uh(xh) is negative deﬁnite), and the closure in R2 of each level
set is contained in R2
++. The assumption of thrice diﬀerentiability is needed since the
second derivatives of demand functions are important in our analysis.
Under these assumptions, the objective function in (2) is concave in zh and the




















h + zhrs 
rs = 0, (3)
where ∂
∂x0uh and ∂
∂x1uh are derivatives with respect to the ﬁrst period consumption
and the second period consumption, respectively. The solution is unique if it exists
by the strict concavity. Since our analysis will be done locally around a competitive
equilibrium where the optimal choice is well deﬁned, we will assume that a solution
exists in the relevant domain. For a vector of returns r = (··· ,rs,···) ∈ RS
++, let Zh (r)
be the unique solution to (3); that is, Zh (r) is the quantity demanded by household h
for the asset. Let Z (r) :=
 H
h=1 Zh (r) which is the market excess demand function for
the asset. It can be shown that each Zh is a C2 function, and so is Z. Utilizing the
symmetric nature of the model, the following properties can be readily checked: for each









h + zh˜ r
´˜
, where E is the expectation operator.
5h and any pair of states s and s , and any positive number ρ,
∂
∂rsZh (ρ,··· ,ρ) =
∂
∂rs  Zh (ρ,··· ,ρ), (4)
∂
∂rsZ (ρ,··· ,ρ) =
∂
∂rs  Z (ρ,··· ,ρ). (5)
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium is a vector of returns r = (··· ,rs,···) ∈ RS
++ such that
Z (r) = 0. Equivalently, r is an equilibrium if there exists a vector of asset holdings
z = (zh)
H
h=1 ∈ RH with
 H
h=1 zh = 0, where each zh solves the utility maximization
problem (2), for h = 1,...,H.
When S = 1, our model is a standard two period model of consumption and saving,
and so every equilibrium is eﬃcient. An equilibrium for the case of S = 1 is called a
certainty equilibrium. If ¯ r ∈ R+ is a certainty equilibrium, it can be readily seen that the
vector (¯ r,··· , ¯ r) ∈ RS
++ is an equilibrium for any S > 1: this is an equilibrium where the
households think the sunspot states do not aﬀect the real returns, although they know
that sunspot states are to be observed. Such an equilibrium is called a non-sunspot
equilibrium when S > 1. By the fundamental theorem of welfare economics and risk
aversion, a non-sunspot equilibrium is Pareto eﬃcient. To simplify notation we write ¯ r
instead of (¯ r,··· , ¯ r) whenever it is clear from the context. An equilibrium r is called a
sunspot equilibrium if rs  = rs 
for some s and s .
Example 2 Let H = 2, and uh (x,y) = v (x)+v (y) for both h, where v  > 0 and v   < 0.
e1 = (α,1 − α) and e2 = (1 − α,α), α ∈ (1
2,1]. There is a unique certainty equilibrium
¯ r = 1 where both households consume 1
2 in both periods. Thus Z1 (¯ r) > 0 > Z2 (¯ r). This
is the setup Goenka-Pr´ echac (2006) studied.
We are interested in the structure of the set of utility proﬁles associated with equi-
libria, especially around a non-sunspot equilibrium. For this purpose it is useful to learn
the diﬀerential structure of the set. It is known6 that for any S > 1, generically in
endowments, there are ﬁnitely many non-sunspot equilibria and for any non-sunspot
equilibrium (¯ r,··· , ¯ r), ∂
∂rsZ (¯ r,··· , ¯ r)  = 0 for s = 1,...,S, and moreover Zh  = 0 for any
equilibrium around ¯ r. Thus in particular Z can be solved implicitly around a non-sunspot
6This can be established as a simple corollary to the geneneric regularity result of Cass (1992) on
non-sunspot equilibria. See also the leading example of Cass (1989).







= 0 for r1,...,rS−1 in the domain.
Throughout this paper, we assume that the functions are well deﬁned and the asserted
properties are true; that is, the endowments are chosen in such a way that a non-
sunspot equilibrium exists and these properties hold. As described above, such a choice
is generic, which justiﬁes this assumption. From now on, we set S > 1 and ﬁx a non-
sunspot equilibrium (¯ r,··· , ¯ r). We summarize below the key maintained assumptions
throughout this paper:
Regularity Assumption: ¯ r > 0 and Z (¯ r,··· , ¯ r) = 0. ∂
∂rsZ (¯ r,··· , ¯ r)  = 0 for s =
1,...,S and so there is a C2 function φ deﬁned a neighborhood R ⊆ RS−1
++ around


















A generic element of R is denoted by r−S =
 
r1,...,rS−1 
. By construction, φ(¯ r−S) =
¯ r, and the set of equilibrium asset holdings around a non-sunspot equilibrium (··· , ¯ r,···)
can be found by changing rs around ¯ r for s = 1,...,S − 1. For each h, deﬁne ˆ Zh and ˆ Uh
on R by the following rule:
ˆ Zh (r−S) := Zh (r−S,φ(r−S)),






h − ˆ Zh (r−S),e1





h − ˆ Zh (r−S),e1
h + ˆ Zh (r−S)φ(r−S)
 
.
Namely, ˆ Zh (r−S) is household h’s asset holding and ˆ Uh (r−S) is the corresponding utility






: r−S ∈ R}. We shall refer to this set as the equilibrium manifold
(around the non-sunspot equilibrium), which has dimension S − 1. The corresponding






: r−S ∈ R}. (8)
7Our purpose is to study the local structure of this set around the non-sunspot equilib-
rium.7
3 The Analysis: Characterization in Derivatives
We shall ﬁrst learn how the equilibrium demand ˆ Zh above behaves around ¯ r. It turns out
that the ﬁrst order eﬀect on ˆ Zh is null: if returns are changed marginally from the non-
sunspot equilibrium, the corresponding consumption remains the same. The following
result stating this formally holds from the symmetry.
Lemma 3 For any state s = 1,..,S − 1, ∂
∂rsφ(¯ r−S) = −1. For any household h and
state s = 1,..,S − 1, ∂
∂rs ˆ Zh (¯ r−S) = 0 where ¯ r−S = (··· , ¯ r,···) ∈ RS−1
++ .
Proof. By the symmetry (5), ∂
∂rsZ (¯ r) = ∂
∂rSZ (¯ r) holds for s = 1,...,S − 1. Diﬀerenti-
ating (6) with respect to rs, s  = S, we have, for any r−S ∈ R,
∂
∂rs






∂rsφ(r−S) = 0. (9)
Evaluating this at ¯ r−S = (··· , ¯ r,···) (thus φ(¯ r−S) = ¯ r), using ∂
∂rsZ (¯ r) = ∂







∂rs = 0. So ∂
∂rsφ(¯ r−S) = −1 must hold for s = 1,..,S − 1, since
∂Z(¯ r)
∂rs  = 0 by the regularity assumption.
Now similarly to (9), for any h and state s = 1,..,S − 1, we have ∂





∂rsφ from (7). Then using the symmetry (4) and ∂
∂rsφ(¯ r−S) = −1, we have
∂
∂rs ˆ Zh (¯ r−S) = 0.
To interpret, recall that
 S−1
s=1 rs+φ(rs) is (proportional to) the average equilibrium
returns. So Lemma 3 says that when the return in state s changes, the corresponding
equilibrium average returns remain unchanged up to the ﬁrst order. In fact, the ﬁrst
order eﬀect on the equilibrium utility level is also null. We show this by computing
the derivative of the equilibrium utility level ˆ Uh (r−S) at the non-sunspot equilibrium
¯ r−S := (··· , ¯ r,···). To simplify notation, we write ¯ uh for ˆ Uh evaluated at r−S = ¯ r−S;
7Alternatively, one can directly study the constrained maximization problem of a household’s utility
given equilibrium system of equations, i.e., the ﬁrst order conditions and the market clearing condition,
analogously to the general method developed in Citanna-Kajii-Villanacci (1998). Indeed, this is the path
which Goenka-Pr´ echac (2006) followed. But for the single commodity case, using the excess demand
functions appears more tractable, at least for the purpose of this paper.
8that is, ¯ uh := uh
 
e0
h − ˆ Zh (¯ r−S),e1
h + ˆ Zh (¯ r−S) ¯ r
 
. A similar convention will be used for





Lemma 4 For any household h and any state s = 1,..,S − 1, ∂
∂rs ˆ Uh (¯ r−S) = 0.
Proof. This can be veriﬁed by direct computation as follows: notice that the usual












h − ˆ Zh (r−S),e1







h − ˆ Zh (r−S),e1










h − ˆ Zh (r−S),e1










h − ˆ Zh (r−S),e1






where the envelope property is used to derive the second equation. Therefore, from the
fact ∂




   


















So the non-sunspot equilibrium constitutes a local minimum, a local maximum, or a
saddle point of ˆ Uh for all h. To distinguish these cases, we shall check the Hessian matrix
of ˆ Uh, denoted by D2Uh (¯ r−S), which will depend on the ﬁrst and the second order eﬀects
though the equilibrium function φ. We have already seen the ﬁrst order eﬀects in Lemma
3. Interestingly enough, the Hessian matrix Dφ(¯ r−S) at the non-sunspot equilibrium is













which is well deﬁned by the regularity assumption.
9Lemma 5 The Hessian matrix D2φ(¯ r−S) is as follows:
D2φ(¯ r−S) = ζ
 
 
   
   
 
 






1 ··· 1 2
 
 
   




Thus D2φ(¯ r−S) is positive (resp. negative) deﬁnite if ζ > 0 (resp. ζ < 0)
Proof. Diﬀerentiate the equilibrium identity ˆ Z (r−S) = 0 twice: diﬀerentiating the


































and for s  = 1,...,S − 1 with s   = s:
∂2




























∂rs∂rs  , (14)
= 0.
Write ¯ zs := ∂
∂rsZ (¯ r) and ¯ zss  := ∂2
∂rs∂rs  Z (¯ r). Recall that by the symmetry of excess
demand functions with respect to sunspot states, we have ¯ zs = ¯ z1 and ¯ zss = ¯ z11, and
¯ zss  = z12 for any s,s  with s  = s . Also
∂φ(¯ r−S)
∂rs = −1 for every s by Lemma 3. Rewrite
equations (13) and (14) using these properties, we have




(¯ z11 − ¯ z12) = −¯ z1
∂2φ(¯ r−S)
∂rs∂rs  ,
where s,s  = 1,...,S − 1 and s  = s . From these equations we have:
D2φ(¯ r−S) =
¯ z12 − ¯ z11
¯ z1
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The last part follows since the matrix
 
   
   
   
 






1 ··· 1 2
 
   
   
   
 
is positive deﬁnite.
Recall that the ﬁrst order eﬀect on the equilibrium average returns is null (Lemma
3). Lemma 5, which identify the sign of the second order eﬀect, then says that the sign of
ζ determines the direction of the equilibrium average returns. We shall elaborate more
on this in the next section.
Now we are ready to state the main characterization result for the sign of the Hessian




























where ζ is the number deﬁned in (11).
Proposition 6 For each household h, the Hessian matrix D2 ˆ Uh (¯ r−S) is
D2 ˆ Uh (¯ r−S) = ξh ×
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Thus D2 ˆ Uh (¯ r−S) is negative (resp. positive) deﬁnite if ξh < 0 (resp. ξh > 0). Con-
sequently; (1) the utility level of household h is locally maximized at the non-sunspot
equilibrium if ξh < 0, and it is locally minimized if ξh > 0. (2) conversely, if the utility
level of household h is locally maximized (resp. minimized) at the non-sunspot equilib-
rium, then ξh ≥ 0 (resp. ξh ≤ 0) must hold.
Proof. We shall show that for each h, the Hessian matrix of ˆ Uh at ¯ r−S is as follows:
D2 ˆ Uh (¯ r−S) = κh
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ˆ Zh (¯ r−S)
 2
. Once this is shown, substituting D2φ(¯ r−S) in (12)
into (17), we ﬁnd that (16) holds. Then D2 ˆ Uh (¯ r−S) is a positive deﬁnite matrix multi-
plied by a scaler ξh, so it is negative deﬁnite if ξh < 0, and positive deﬁnite if ξh > 0, as
asserted.
Now to see (17) holds, keeping the envelope property (10) in mind, for any s and s ,
∂2










h − ˆ Zh (r−S),e1














h − ˆ Zh (r−S),e1








To evaluate (18) at r−S = ¯ r−S, notice that since ∂
∂rs ˆ Zh (¯ r−S) = 0 by Lemma 3, the






∂rs ˆ Zh (¯ r−S)
 
= 0 and so all
the terms multiplied by ∂
















































where we used the fact ∂
∂rsφ(¯ r−S) = −1 for the last equation. And similarly, if s  = s ,
∂2















∂rs∂rs  φ(¯ r−S). (20)
Writing (19) and (20) together in a matrix form, we ﬁnd that the S − 1 dimensional
Hessian matrix D ˆ Uh (¯ r−S) has the form (17).
Remark 7 Notice that given the non-sunspot equilibrium ¯ r, which can be found from
the case of S = 1, Lemma 6 is a characterization result in the primitives of the model:
the derivatives of the excess demand function can be computed, in principle, from the
ﬁrst order condition (3), and so ξh can be found without solving the equilibrium system
for sunspot equilibria.
Therefore, the key parameter to determine the welfare property around the non-
sunspot equilibrium is the sign of ξh deﬁned by (15). Recall that
∂2¯ uh
∂(x1)2 is negative by
strict concavity and that
∂¯ uh
∂x1 is positive by monotonicity. So the ﬁrst term in (15) is
12always negative, and the sign of ξh depends on the common parameter ζ and household
h’s position Zh (¯ r). This observation leads to the following result:
Corollary 8 If ζ ≥ 0, for every household h with ˆ Zh (¯ r−S) < 0, the level of equilibrium
utility ˆ Uh (r−S) is locally maximized at r−S = ¯ r−S, i.e., at the non-sunspot equilibrium;
If ζ ≤ 0, for every household h with ˆ Zh (¯ r−S) > 0, the level of equilibrium utility ˆ Uh (r−S)
is locally maximized at r−S = ¯ r−S. Thus the non-sunspot equilibrium constitutes the
(locally) most preferred equilibrium allocation at least for all borrowers, or for all savers.
Proof. This follows from Lemmas 4, 6 and 5, since ζ ≥ 0 or ζ ≤ 0 holds.
It is of course not surprising that some household’s utility must be maximized at
the non-sunspot equilibrium; otherwise we would have a sunspot equilibrium improving
upon the eﬃcient allocation. The interesting implication of Corollary 8 is that all the
households on one side of the market must dislike sunspot equilibria.
As discussed in Introduction, we can give an intuitive reason for this result: since
increased volatility is always welfare worsening, thus the welfare improving general equi-
librium eﬀect must be through the change in average returns. An increase in average
returns will hurt all the borrowers and a decrease will hurt all the savers. It should be
noted here that the sign of changes are determined by the second order terms, as the
results in this section have shown. This point is not an obvious point.
Remark 9 Since our analysis is only local, the assumptions on utility functions need to
hold only locally around the consumption vector at the non-sunspot equilibrium. So the
results hold for quadratic utility models, for instance.
There are classes of examples where all the households’ level of utility is maximized
at the non-sunspot equilibrium. We give one of them as an example below.
Example 10 Let each uh be a discounted sum of a quadratic utility function: uh (x,y) :=
 
ahx − x2 
+ δh
 
ahy − y2 
where ah > 0 and δh > 0, and assume that a non-sunspot
equilibrium exists and the regularity assumptions are satisﬁed around the non-sunspot
equilibrium. By inspection of the ﬁrst order condition, it can be easily checked that





αh and βh are constants. Then ∂2
∂r1∂r2Z (¯ r) = ∂2
∂(r1)
2Z (¯ r) and so ζ = 0 (and ξh =
13∂2¯ uh
∂(x1)2 (Zh (¯ r))
2 < 0). Hence by Corollary 8, for every household, the level of equilibrium
utility ˆ Uh (r−S) is locally maximized at r−S = ¯ r−S.
Examples where a household’s utility is locally minimized at the non-sunspot equi-
librium can be constructed.
Example 11 Let H = 2, and set u1 (x,y) := log(x) + log(y) and e1 = (1,0). Then, by
direct calculation, we see that for any r >> 0, Z1 (r) = 1
2. Thus the derivatives of the
market excess demand function coincide with those of Z2. Given this freedom, it is then
possible to ﬁnd Z2 (and underlying utility function u2) such that ξ2 > 0. For instance,
set u2 (x,y) := log(x) + log(y) and e2 = (0,1), and by direct computations it can be
shown that ξ2 > 0: this is the leading example of Goenka-Pr´ echac (2006).
Note that it would be easier to construct an example, if utility functions are not
identical to each other in the example above. Since the characterization result (Lemma
6) does not require any symmetry across the households, we contend that the existence
of households who are beneﬁtted by sunspots does not depend on the symmetry of
households’ characteristics.
4 Discussion: Who will be beneﬁtted from sunspots?
Proposition 6 shows that the local property of ˆ Uh at the non-sunspot equilibrium is
captured by a single parameter ξh deﬁned in (15). We shall ﬁrst interpret the parameter










2 + Zh (¯ r)ζ. (21)
The ﬁrst term of the right hand side of (21) is always negative by risk aversion.
Notice that this term is determined by household h’s preferences given the (non-random)
real return ¯ r at the non-sunspot equilibrium. So this can be interpreted as the direct
negative risk eﬀect of increasing volatility. The second term on the other hand represents
the general equilibrium eﬀect through markets, since the parameter ζ deﬁned in (11) is
determined by the market excess demand. The parameter ζ is multiplied by individual
excess demand, and therefore by Proposition 6, other things being equal, it tends to be
those households with large net trade is large who are possibly beneﬁtted from sunspots.
14Dividing both sides of (21) by (Zh (¯ r))
2, and applying Proposition 6, we know that

















Zh (¯ r) is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, relative
to no trade. So for instance when ζ < 0 and Zh (¯ r) < 0, it is the households with high
enough coeﬃcient of risk aversion who is beneﬁtted from sunspots, other things being
equal.
As is shown in Corollary 8, all the households on one side of the market dislike
sunspots, and the households on the other side may or may not be beneﬁtted from
sunspots. Indeed, in the Goenka-Pr´ echac model of symmetric two households, the bor-
rower, i.e., the household with Zh (¯ r) < 0, is beneﬁtted under some assumption.
Is this general? That is, does it tend to be borrowers who are beneﬁtted from
sunspots? We shall study this question in the rest of this section.
The question is whether ζ ≤ 0 holds under some reasonable conditions, in view of
(22). Recall that by Lemma 5, we know ζ ≤ 0 holds if and only if D2φ(¯ r−S) is negative
semi-deﬁnite, which should be equivalent to the average equilibrium returns falling at
the margin by Lemma 3. We shall formally state this point below.
Lemma 12 D2φ(¯ r) is negative semi-deﬁnite if φ(r−S) ≤ S¯ r −
 S−1
s=1 rs holds for any
small enough r−S in R. D2φ(¯ r) is positive semi-deﬁnite if φ(r−S) ≥ S¯ r−
 S−1
s=1 rs holds
for any small enough r−S in R.
Proof. If for any small enough r−S in R, φ(r−S) ≤ S¯ r −
 S−1
s=1 rs holds, r−S = ¯ r−S
is a maximizer of the function φ(r−S) +
 S−1
s=1 rs, since φ(¯ r−S) = ¯ r. Thus the Hessian
matrix of this function, which is just D2φ(¯ r), must be negative semi-deﬁnite. The other
statement can be shown analogously.
This result suggests the following comparative statics question. Starting from a ﬁxed,
sure return ¯ r, suppose that the returns get slightly risky in the sense that the average






. We shall discuss two conditions to determine the sign of ζ.
The ﬁrst condition is about ∂
∂r1Z. First recall that that t  → Z (t,t,...,t) corresponds
the standard market excess demand function in an exchange economy with two goods.
15The standard law of demand corresponds to Z is increasing in r’s: increasing r means
that the relative price of period 0 consumption increases, and thus household saves more.
So let us say that the excess demand respects the law of demand at the non-sunspot
equilibrium if ∂
∂r1Z (¯ r) > 0. Note that by continuity, this means that Z is increasing
function of r around ¯ r. Obviously the law of demand is respected for all household, i.e.,
∂
∂r1Zh (¯ r) > 0 for all h, then clearly ∂
∂r1Z (¯ r) > 0 holds.
The law of demand is not a general property in our general equilibrium model. But if
there is a unique certainty equilibrium, i.e., Z (t,t,...,t) = 0 if and only if t = ¯ r, then the
graph of this function cut zero from below once, and so d




∂rs > 0 holds.
In general, there exists at least one certainty equilibrium where the law of demand is
respected.
The second condition states the behavior of the excess demand against small risks.
Let us say that the excess demand exhibits risk-sensitivity if for any r in a neighborhood






≥ Z (¯ r) holds.
This condition does not hold in general, and we believe it tends to be more stringent
than the law of demand. However, a simple foundation can be given from the view point
of an individual portfolio choice problem. To elaborate on this, let us study the simple
portfolio problem (2) when u is a discounted sum of a concave utility function vh; that
is uh (x,y) = vh (x) + δhvh (y).8 Then the ﬁrst order condition (3) simpliﬁes and it can
















h + zhrs 
rs = 0. (23)
The second term in the left hand side of (23) is the expected value of the function






x with respect to a random variable r. Now suppose the expected
value of r is ¯ r, i.e.,
 S
s=1 rs = S¯ r. By the usual argument of risk aversion, if the function























h + zh¯ r
 
¯ r.
On the other hand, given vector r >> 0, the left hand side of (23) is decreasing in zh.
So we conclude that Zh (r) > ¯ zh := Zh (¯ r) if r is close enough to ¯ r, if ηh (x;zh) is convex
in a neighborhood of ¯ zh.
By diﬀerentiating twice, we see that a suﬃcient condition for the convexity of ηh (x;zh)
8The following comparative statics analysis is very standard. See for instance Chapter II of Gollier
(2001).
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(¯ zh)




h + ¯ zh¯ r
 
¯ zh > 0. When household h is pru-
dent, that is, v
   
h > 0, then the inequality is automatically satisﬁed if ¯ zh < 0, i.e., h is
a borrower. When ¯ zh > 0, then the convexity depends on the size of relative prudence:
dividing the inequality by zh and collecting terms, we have
−










h + ¯ zh¯ r
  ¯ zh¯ r > 2. (24)
That is, the coeﬃcient of relative prudence (relative to net trade) at the equilibrium
consumption is more than 2.
To sum up, if all the house holds are prudent, and the condition (24) holds for every
h, then every household’s excess demand exhibits risk-sensitivity, and so does the market
excess demand.
The next result gives a condition where if there is a household who is beneﬁtted
from sunspots, it must be a borrower.
Proposition 13 Suppose at the non-sunspot equilibrium ¯ r, the excess demand function
respects the law of demand, and exhibits risk-sensitivity. Then D2φ(¯ r) is negative semi-
deﬁnite, i.e., ζ ≤ 0.














Since around ¯ r the law of demand holds and Z is locally an increasing function, the re-
turn in state S must become less attractive: i.e.,., φ(r−S) ≤ S¯ r −
 S−1
s=1 rs. Thus the
conclusion follows from Lemma 12.
5 Relation to The Goenka-Pr´ echac Condition.
With our results in hand, we shall now examine the Goenka-Pr´ echac model of sym-
metric two households (see examples 2) more closely. Goenka and Pr´ echac (2006) have
shown that household 2’s equilibrium utility is locally minimized at the non-sunspot



















17By symmetry, there is a unique equilibrium in this model, where both households
consume 1





> 0 which is nothing but the equilibrium
excess demand of household 1, the saver. Recall that v   < 0 and α > 1
2, dividing both
sides of (25) by −v    1
2
 
> 0, we get
−
v     1
2
 
v    1
2
  ε > 1. (26)
That is, one way to read the Goenka-Pr´ echac condition is that the coeﬃcient of relative
prudence (in terms of net trade) of the saver is higher than 1. Goenka and Pr´ echac
interpret (26) as the borrower’s coeﬃcient of absolute prudence is greater than 1/ε, but
then the threshold depends on the size of trade. These observations are very curious
since the relevant parameter should be the borrower’s degree of risk aversion relative to
the general equilibrium eﬀect by Proposition 6.
We shall demonstrate below that the condition (25) is in fact the sum of the risk
aversion term and the general equilibrium eﬀect term, and therefore the Goenka-Pr´ echac
condition does correspond to our characterization. We therefore conclude that the two
observations given above are misleading.
In their model the ﬁrst order condition (3) is reduced to the following:







v   
e1
h + zrs 
= 0. (27)
Since the equilibrium consumption is 1
2 for both households and both periods, all the
derivatives of v are to be evaluated at 1
2, so from now on we omit the reference to 1
2
to simplify the notation. By diﬀerentiating (27) with respect to r1, evaluating at the
unique equilibrium ¯ r = 1, we ﬁnd the ﬁrst derivative of the excess demand function of
household h is −(v  + v  Zh (¯ r))/2Sv  . Adding these up we have
∂Z
∂r1 (¯ r) =
−v 
Sv  , (28)
which is always positive. This is of course not surprising since there is a unique non-
sunspot equilibrium in their model and so the law of demand must be satisﬁed at the
equilibrium.
Diﬀerentiating (27) again in rs, s = 1,2, and evaluating them at ¯ r, we ﬁnd the second




2 (¯ r) =
2v  − v   ε2 (S − 1)
S2v   , (29)
∂2Z
∂r1∂r2 (¯ r) =
2v  − v   ε2
S2v   . (30)
Using (28), (29) and (30), the general equilibrium eﬀect ζ in (11) is given as follows:
ζ = −
v   
v  ε2. (31)
Notice that ζ < 0 given prudence v    > 0, so it must be the borrower (household 2)
if some household is ever beneﬁtted from sunspots under prudence. The condition (24)
does not matter here because of the symmetry of the model; when v    > 0, household
2 may decrease the demand against risks. But it turns out that household 1’s demand
increases more because they have the same utility function v, and that the aggregate
demand exhibits risk-sensitivity.
Now from (31), we can ﬁnd ξ2 in (15), which is shown below:
ξ2 = v   (−ε)
2 + v  (−ε)ζ
= ε2  
v   + εv    
.
By Proposition 6, household 2 is locally beneﬁtted from sunspots if (and almost only
if) ξ2 > 0, but this is exactly the condition (31) says. This is what we wanted to
demonstrate.
6 Concluding Remarks
To conclude, let us provide a few remarks concerning the restriction of our analysis.
First of all, the assumption of equally probable sunspots is not restrictive. Notice
that our analysis does not exclude sunspot equilibria where the return rs is constant on
a subset of states. Since the method of our proofs does not depend on the number of
states directly, our results can be readily translated for the case where probabilities are
rational numbers. We believe that applying continuity, the case of irrational numbers
can be treated as well.
If there are multiple consumption goods, the set of sunspot equilibria is still parametrized
by S −1 variables. A complication arises due to changes in equilibrium relative prices of
19goods within each spot markets. This will make the analysis potentially involved, but it
appears to us that the nature of the analysis will not change. Thus we conjecture that
similar results obtain if the assumption of a single consumption good is relaxed.
In the case of multiple goods, however, there is an extension which is not covered
in our analysis, which is the case of a real asset. In our case the sunspot equilibria
are parametrized by real returns, but this will not happen if the real return is ﬁxed
independent of sunspots. Indeed, when there is one consumption good, if the real asset
is ﬁxed, there is no sunspot equilibrium as shown in Mas-Colell (1992).9 But when there
are multiple goods, Gottardi and Kajii (1999) established an existence result of a sunspot
equilibrium: a sunspot equilibrium exists because relative prices of goods may depend
on sunspots, which in eﬀect makes the real return of the single real asset dependent on
sunspots. It is not clear at this point whether or not the technique developed in this
paper can be applied in this case.
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